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P29-11

15 May 1973

MEMORANDUM FOR: General Graham

SUBJECT: Intelligence Production Review

REFERENCE: Memo fr [ ] to you, dtd 8 May 73,  
Same Subject

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1. An analysis of collateral CIA, State Department (INR), and DIA finished intelligence on Southeast Asia published during the period April 1972 - March 1973 is attached. As was the case with the referenced intelligence production review on Latin America, intelligence in "periodicals"--e.g., the CIB and DIA INTSUM--was not considered to be finished intelligence and hence was not reviewed.

2. More than 80% of the CIA, INR, and DIA finished collateral intelligence production on Southeast Asia in the 12-month period fell into the "Most Appropriate" agency category. INR was the major "offender" in the "Least Appropriate" category, with most INR efforts in this regard dealing with military aspects of the Vietnam war. That this occurred, however, could have derived from the paucity of DIA finished intelligence on the subjects of concern to State. For example, in May and October 1972, INR addressed the VC/NVA threat to Saigon, perhaps in the absence of any Defense effort. Whether or not DIA perceived the threat in the same terms as INR, it would seem appropriate for DIA to have addressed the question as one which concerned policy makers. Interestingly, during the period of this survey, DIA finished current intelligence production focused mainly on order-of-battle data, Military Intelligence Summaries, and assessments of the renewed air and naval campaign against North Vietnam.

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3. Considerable overlap among producers showed up in the Southeast Asia survey--e.g., between State and CIA on the Philippines; you may recall that the same type of problem surfaced in [ ] survey. Moreover, what appeared to be unwarranted duplication among the DIA, JCS, and Service intelligence elements was noted, although more intensive research will be required to establish if this was and still is the case and the reason(s) therefore.

4. General recommendations for improved production management must await the findings of at least one more survey. At this point, however, [ ] tentative recommendations--having the DCI address the matter of appropriate agency production, and devising means to keep production overlap and duplication in check--are taking on more and more validity. Additional research may also show that the question of intradepartmental/intra-agency duplication should be addressed. We can take on this problem, and even the larger question of duplication in intelligence periodicals--a particularly sensitive issue--if you think it worthwhile.

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Attachment

Distribution:

✓ Orig - Addressee

[ ]

1 - PRG Subject  
1 - PRG Chrono

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CIA, State and DIA Intelligence Production  
April 1972 - March 1973

Southeast Asia<sup>1</sup>

	Total Documents <sup>2</sup>	Most Appropriate <sup>3</sup> Producer	Appropriate <sup>4</sup> Producer	Least Appropriate <sup>5</sup> Producer
CIA	33	26	5	2
State (INR)	54	38	5	11
DIA	41	41		
TOTAL	128	105	10	13 <sup>6</sup>

<sup>1</sup>Includes Burma, Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, North Vietnam and South Vietnam.

<sup>2</sup>Based on CRS (AEGIS file) holdings.

<sup>3</sup>Criteria:

- a. Production on a subject under DCID authority.
- b. Production on a subject clearly within the responsibility of the producing agency and production for which the producer has the greatest competence within the Intelligence Community.

<sup>4</sup>Criteria:

- a. Production does not violate DCID authority.
- b. The producing agency has some responsibility for such production and a considerable degree of competence on the subject.

<sup>5</sup>Criteria:

- a. Production violates DCID authority. (No product in this sample review violated DCID authority.)
- b. The producing agency has little direct responsibility for such production and limited competence in the subject area.

<sup>6</sup>Documents in the Least Appropriate Producer category--

CIA:

1. Security in the Phnom Penh Military Region (PPSMR) (FANK, VC/NVA, KC, Cambodia), published by OER as IM 72-147, October 1972.
2. North Vietnamese Armor, published by OSR as IM 72-097, June 1972.

State:

1. Patterns and Trends in the Development of Chinese Communist Military Assistance Activities Since 1954, published by INR/RSG, October 1972.
2. Non-Communist Chinese Military Forces in Southeast Asia, Or Terry and the Pirates, published by INR/REA, December 1972.
3. South Vietnam: Hanoi Maintains Its Options, published by INR/REA, April 1972.
4. South Vietnam: The Threat to Saigon (NVA/VC, ARVN, RF/PF, Intentions, Capabilities), published by INR/REA, May 1972.
5. South Vietnam: The Decisive Battle at Hue? (NVA/VC, ARVN, Mission, Capabilities), published by INR/REA, May 1972.
6. Indochina: Are PRC Forces in North Vietnam?, published by INR/REA, June 1972.
7. Vietnam: And Now the Armed Political Struggle (Cease-fire, VC/NVA), published by INR/REA, November 1972.
8. South Vietnam: The Communist Strike at Pacification, published by INR/REA, August 1972.
9. South Vietnam: The Threat to Saigon (VC/NVA), published by INR/REA, October 1972.
10. Vietnam: The July Balance Sheet on Hanoi's Offensive, published by INR/REA, July 1972.
11. The New Communist Military Weaponry in Vietnam (PT-63, BTR-50, BTR-60, APC, Tank, AT-3, SA-4, SA-7, SA-2, T-54), published by INR/RSG, June 1972.

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